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Abstract: Much of the macroeconomics literature dealing with wealth distribution has become abstracted 
from modeling housing explicitly. This paper investigates the properties of the wealth distribution and the 
portfolio composition regarding housing and equity holdings and their relationship to macroeconomic 
shocks. To this end, I construct a business cycle model in which agents differ in age, income, and wealth 
and derive utility from housing services. The model is consistent with several facts such as the life-cycle 
pattern of housing-to-wealth ratios, the larger degree of concentration for nonhousing wealth, and the 
smaller weight of housing in richer households’ portfolios as well as the larger housing-to-wealth ratios in 
recessions. In addition, the model delivers the familiar business-cycle moments regarding relative 
standard deviations and procyclicality of consumption, investment, and employment. 
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1 Introduction
Housing accounts for a substantial fraction of wealth in developed economies. In the US,
residential structures, with a nominal value of 11 trillion dollars, account for half of the
entire capital stock. Residential investment accounts for a third of total investment and
about 9% of output. Moreover, from an individual's point of view a house is usually both
an investment good and a durable good that provides a °ow of \shelter" services. In the
data, renters spend about 20% of their total expenditures on housing.
There exists an extensive literature in macroeconomics that compares the wealth dis-
tributions implied by equilibrium models with those observed in the data. Following the
tradition of one-sector models, these studies have mostly treated capital as a monolith,
e®ectively subsuming the housing stock into an overall measure of capital. Thus, despite
the importance of housing in the US economy, housing investment and the consumption
of housing services have been largely absent (with very few exceptions) from studies of
the wealth distribution.
Previous studies that do consider wealth distribution properties of real estate holdings
include Gruber and Martin (2003) and D¶ ³az and Luengo-Prado (2003)1. They introduce
housing (or durable goods in general) into Aiyagari's (1994) framework to evaluate the
e®ects on the level of precautionary savings as well as the ability of the model to deliver
the wealth composition and concentration observed in the data. Both studies feature
dynastic agents. Yet, as I argue below, the data show a clear life-cycle pattern in the
composition of personal portfolios between housing and ¯nancial wealth, making the dy-
nastic framework inappropriate for studying this issue.
In this paper I construct a business cycle model in which agents di®er in age, income
1Another example is Silos (2004a). In that study, I construct a life-cycle model with a housing rental
market and investigate the wealth distribution properties and the choice of tenure pattern over the life
cycle.
1and wealth and where housing is explicitly modelled. The purpose is to investigate the
model's ability to describe properties of the portfolio composition and the wealth distri-
bution and their relationship to macroeconomic shocks.
Age heterogeneity is desirable in any model that deals with housing investment 2. One
of the most salient features of a representative individual's wealth portfolio is the age-
dependent pattern{young people accumulate home equity before they start accumulating
¯nancial assets. Thus, early in people's lives, housing-to-wealth ratios are large, declining
as people accumulate more non-real estate assets, and increasing slightly at the end due
to depletion of ¯nancial assets during retirement. This pattern is depicted in Figure 1.
































































































































































































































































2Platania and Schlagenhauf (2000) have an equilibrium life-cycle asset allocation model between hous-
ing and equity, modelling the rental market for housing explicitly. The investment is a zero versus ¯xed
house size choice, therefore not valid for studying wealth distribution or even portfolio choice issues.
2non-housing consumption, housing services and leisure. Because of heterogeneity across
agents, it is the entire distribution of wealth that determines aggregate non-residential
capital and labor and hence, interest rates and wages. The solution of the model involves
keeping track, at least approximately, of the entire distribution of agents. To do this, I
utilize a version of the Krusell-Smith (1998) algorithm, modi¯ed suitably to accommodate
the complexities introduced by the presence of a housing choice.
To summarize the main ¯ndings, the model does a remarkable job of matching the
life-cycle pattern of households' portfolios regarding housing and equity. The housing-to-
wealth ratio peaks at ages 26-30, and the slope of the decline matches the data almost
exactly. In addition, the model is consistent with housing-to-net-worth ratios being larger
for the poor than for the wealthy. As in the data, the housing-to-net-worth ratio is smaller
in booms than in recessions, and most of the di®erence is concentrated in the younger
age groups. Regarding the aggregate wealth composition, the fraction of business capital
stock in the model is 59%, close to the approximately 50% in the data, and the model
delivers a ratio of residential investment to output that coincides with the empirical value.
The level of concentration of housing wealth is smaller than that of ¯nancial (or non-
housing wealth), both in the model and in the data. However, the model delivers much
greater housing wealth equality than is present in the data, although for non-housing
wealth the model distribution is close to that in the data.
Finally, the stylized business cycle facts in the model economies presented are con-
sistent with features in the post-war US economy. Speci¯cally, the model delivers the
correct relative standard deviations and procyclicality of consumption, investment and
employment. Residential investment, however, is countercyclical, contrary to what is ob-
served in the data. This shortcoming could be remedied by introducing features that
3have improved the correlation patterns between residential investment and output 3. In
any case, the model provides a useful, general equilibrium setting for the study of the
macroeconomics of housing.
2 The Model Economy
The model has most features of standard overlapping generations models while introducing
elements of real business cycle theory.
At each point in time there is a continuum of agents with unit mass, belonging to one
of I generations. Death is certain at age I, hence the fraction of agents of age i 2 I is
equal to 1=I. Individuals are born with zero wealth and work for T years.
2.1 Preferences
Individuals maximize their expected lifetime utility over non-housing consumption (c),






The function u is increasing, continuous, and strictly concave. The notation is stan-
dard. The discount factor is denoted by ¯. Given that death is certain, the e®ective
discount factor is constant across generations.
2.2 Technology
The environment is characterized by uncertain productivity in the aggregate and at the
individual level. Agents have di®erent realizations of productivity shocks (denoted by »)
3For example, by an adjustment cost function for housing coupled with countercyclical earnings vari-
ability, as suggested by Peterson (2003)
4to their own labor supply, but an aggregate shock z also a®ects the entire economy im-
plying di®erent wage and rental rates in each time period. The aggregate technology used
to produce output Y combines capital K and labor N, through the function zF(K;N),
which satis¯es the standard properties: strictly increasing, strictly concave and homoge-
neous of degree one. Denote the probability of transiting from state z;» to state z0;»0 by
¼(z0;»0jz;»).
The resulting output can be either consumed, invested in business capital (k) or in-
vested in residential capital (h). Using this residential capital, the technology for produc-
ing housing services is simple. One unit of residential stock h gives one unit of services s.
Output can be costlessly transformed into business or residential capital, and these de-
preciate at rates ±k and ±h respectively. The aggregate resource constraint in time period
t is:
Yt = ztF(Kt;Nt) = Ct + Kt+1 + Ht+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±h)Ht ¡ (1 ¡ ±k)Kt (2)
Consumption smoothing is carried out by adjusting the levels of the business capital
stock and the residential stock. There are no contingent claims markets for hedging
idiosyncratic productivity shocks across individuals. The borrowing constraint is speci¯ed
as a fraction of the holdings of residential capital, thus resembling the use of housing as
collateral in the form of home equity lines of credit, that are popular instruments to
smooth adverse shocks. A version of the model will set the fraction to be zero, restricting
holdings of capital to be positive.
2.3 Timing
Households ¯rst observe both the aggregate shock z and the idiosyncratic shock » then
they make consumption, investment and leisure decisions, and get labor and capital in-
come. Transfers of residential capital between agents are carried out at the end of the
period. This will guarantee that the housing services are enjoyed from the amount of
5residential stock brought into the period.
2.4 Equilibrium
Before de¯ning the recursive competitive equilibrium it is useful to write the agent's prob-
lem in recursive form.
The state variables are the individual's holdings of business capital k, of residential
capital h, the individual productivity shock », the aggregate shock z and the joint dis-
tribution over assets, ages and productivity shocks, ©. Let r(z;©) and w(z;©) denote
the interest rates and wages, and ´, an age-dependent e±ciency factor. Notice that the
notation makes clear that prices depend on the entire distribution of agents, since this
distribution will determine the aggregate capital-labor ratio the following period. This
ratio determines factor prices. The Bellman equation for an individual of age i 2 I who

















0 · w(z;©)»´i + (1 + r(z;©) ¡ ±k)k + (1 ¡ ±h)h (4)
k
0 ¸ ¡(1 ¡ °)h; s = h; c > 0; h
0 > 0; l + n = 1 (5)
©
0 = G(z;©) (6)
Agents maximize expected lifetime utility by choosing the levels of housing and busi-
ness capital holdings, hours worked and non-housing consumption. Equation (4) is the
budget constraint for the agent in which the sources of income are capital interest and
compensation for labor. The ¯rst component of equation (5) is the borrowing constraint
which speci¯es that the agent cannot borrow more than a fraction 1 ¡° of the house she
6already owns. Equation (6) is the law of motion for the aggregate wealth distribution
which agents take as given.
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is a value function V , policy
functions fk0;c;h0;lg, factor prices w and r and an aggregate law of motion G such that:
1. Factor prices satisfy:
r(z;©) = FK(K(z;©);N(z;©)) (7)




























= F(K(z;©);N(z;©))+(1¡±k)K(z;©)+(1¡±h)H(z;©) (Goods Market) (11)
3. The aggregate law of motion G is generated by the aggregate shock z and the
decision rules k0 and h0.
The equilibrium de¯ned above can not be computed without some modi¯cation. In this
model, agents solve a slightly di®erent problem than the one postulated in equations
(3)-(6). The reason is their inability to keep track of all the state variables speci¯ed, in
particular, the income-wealth distribution which is an in¯nite-dimensional object. I follow
Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) and use a \partial information" approach that replaces
the entire distribution with a ¯nite number of moments. In other words, agents keep
track of some moments of the distribution and use these to forecast future prices, instead
7of the entire distribution itself. The ¯nal goal of agents is to forecast the capital-labor
ratio, as it su±ces to forecast interest rates and wages. One hopes that this forecast is
accurate enough so as to have negligible quantitative implications when using this com-
putational approach. In Krusell and Smith's work agents use a ¯rst-order autoregressive
process (conditional on the current aggregate state) in the logarithm of K (the mean of
the distribution) as their forecasting instrument. This turns out to work remarkably well,
with very small forecasting errors.
The presence of housing complicates the problem slightly. Although it is true that only
the aggregate capital-labor ratio today, ends up being enough to forecast the aggregate
capital-labor ratio next period, the forecasting ability of agents increased signi¯cantly by
using a \regime-switching" model (similar to Hamilton (1989)). The di®erence between
this and Krusell and Smith's speci¯cation is that agents take into account the probability
of transiting between aggregate states of the economy when forecasting. The reason for
the increase in ¯t is the large swings in both business and residential investment, partly
due to the absence of frictions that make portfolio adjustments di±cult. Notice that the
stochastic process for the aggregate shock is known by the agents and hence they can
make optimal forecasts knowing the current shock and the current value of the capital-


















0 · w(z;K=N)»´i + (1 + r(z;K=N) ¡ ±k)k + (1 ¡ ±h)h (13)
k
0 ¸ ¡(1 ¡ °)h; s = h; c > 0; h










8A Technical Appendix at the end provides detailed information on the computations
involved in order to solve this problem. In a few words, given values for a(z) and b(z),
agents compute optimal policies. Simulating the economy for a large number of time peri-
ods (and for a large number of agents) provides a time series for the aggregate capital-labor
ratio. New values for parameters a(z) and b(z) are estimated by maximum likelihood.
This procedure is repeated as many times as necessary until the values for a(z) and b(z)
used by agents, roughly coincide with the ones obtained from the aggregate time series. If
the forecasting model is adequate (as measured by some metric such as the RMSE, corre-
lation between predicted and actual values, etc...) an equilibrium has been found. If not,
it is necessary to either increase the number of moments used or change the functional
form in (15).
3 Parameterization
Given the large amount of time involved in solving the model I have tried to keep the
number of moments that, by construction, match features of US data at a minimum.
Whenever possible I have assigned parameter values drawing on previous sources or di-
rectly estimating empirical counterparts from the data.
3.1 Demographics
Agents live for I = 60 periods. I will assume that the ¯rst age in the model corresponds
to 21 years old and they die with certainty when they reach 80. Individuals work for
T = 40 periods, thus retiring when they are roughly 60 years old. The absence of a Social
Security scheme implies that when retired, agents live o® wealth accumulated during the
working years.
93.2 Preferences and Endowments
The utility function chosen is of the logarithmic class, commonplace in traditional busi-
ness cycle models:
u(c;h;l) = µln(c) + (1 ¡ µ)ln(s) + !ln(l) (16)
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time in each period that is allocated between
work and leisure ( there is no home production). One of the moments targeted to match
a feature of the US data is an average of 32% of time devoted to work. Notice that this
is an average over the entire population, including retirees: agents of working-age devote
a larger fraction. This average determined a value for ! of roughly 1.2. This value was
used for all versions of the model, the aggregate average was a target only in the ¯rst
version, which allows no borrowing. The discount factor was set at 0.96, which is the
value used by Gourinchas (2000) but smaller than values used in other life-cycle models.
However, the absence of death uncertainty in this model makes it di±cult to compare
discount factors across these di®erent studies. The value for µ, the share of non-housing
consumption in the utility function, is set at 0.8. This value has been used by Peterson
(2003) and it is consistent with the share of housing expenditures being roughly 20% in
the Consumer Expenditure Survey4.
The labor endowment process is a ¯nite-state approximation of the model for the
idiosyncratic component of labor earnings estimated in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(2004). Their sample is annual covering the period 1968-1993, with data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Denoting by uit = ln(yit) the logarithm of the id-
iosyncratic component of labor income for household i at time t, the model estimated
4Note: we can only measure expenditures, while the utility function is de¯ned over service °ows, which
in the case of housing can be very di®erent. This 20% ¯gure is a rough approximation.
10is:
uit = zit + ²it (17)
zit = ½zi;t¡1 + ºit
where ²it » N(0;¾2
²) and ºit » N(0;¾2
º). Peterson (2003) and Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2002) report ½ = 0:935, ¾2
² = 0:017 and ¾2
º = 0:061. I have approximated this
process as a three state Markov Chain 5, normalizing the average value for the idiosyncratic










At any time period the proportions of agents with high, middle and low productivity
are 0:295;0:410;0:295 respectively. The goal of Storesletten et al.'s paper is to estimate
a model with counter-cyclical volatility to show that in recessions the uncertainty about
future earnings is larger. The model in this paper is suitable for analyzing implications
for business cycle analysis of such a process. This can be particularly relevant for the
behavior of residential investment, as shown in Peterson (2003). For simplicity I have
restricted the income process to have a constant variance.
In addition to this idiosyncratic productivity shock agents face an age-dependent ef-
¯ciency pro¯le f´igI
i=1 used in Huggett and Ventura (1999) 6. Hansen (1993) estimated
median wage rates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for di®erent age groups.
5The reason to have three states is that it is the minimum dimension with which I can introduce some
degree of skewness. In some cases though, and probably more so here given that the original continuous
state-space process is an ARMA(1,1), it is desirable to trade o® some accuracy on the dimension of
the state space to enrich the dynamics of the underlying autoregressive process. Making the dynamics
richer while keeping the three states was computationally infeasible. See Silos (2004b) for an extensive
discussion and approach to evaluating that tradeo®.
6Mark Huggett kindly provided these data.
11Huggett and Ventura used Hansen's estimates, and set them to be the wage corresponding
to the age in the center of the group and linearly interpolated to obtain values for all ages.
A plot of this e±ciency pro¯le is shown in Figure 2.
3.3 Technology
The functional form chosen for the aggregate production function is a Cobb-Douglas on
labor and capital, F(Kt;Nt) = K®
t N
1¡®
t , with ® = 0:36. This number implies a labor
share in national income of about 0.64.
The depreciation rates are obtained directly from the data in the following way. In a
non-stochastic steady state, the capital accumulation equations in the model impliy the







In US annual postwar data 7 these two expressions imply values of ±k = 0:094 and ±h =
0:043.
The number of states for the aggregate productivity shock is set at 2, a recession value
and an expansion value. In a manner similar to Prescott (1986), I have estimated the
parameters ½ and ¾ in an autoregression of the deviations around a linear trend of the
Solow residual. The frequency is quarterly and the sample is 1964-2003.
lnzt = ½ lnzt¡1 + ²t; ²t » N(0;¾
2) (21)
The parameter estimates were ½ = 0:9329 and ¾ = 0:00738. In the yearly frequency these
7The reader is referred to the appendix for de¯nitions of data variables used throughout the paper.
8Prescott(1986) reports ½ = 0:95 and ¾ = 0:00763. My estimates re°ect the smaller volatility of
movements of GDP around trend in the United States during the '90s.
12imply an unconditional standard deviation of 2.05% and a ¯rst-order autocorrelation of
0.759 for zt. I have approximated this process as a two state Markov chain that matches








Finally, I need to specify a value for °, where (1 ¡ °) is the maximum fraction of the
house against which agents can borrow. Notice that the constraint involves h, the house
currently owned, rather than h0, the house the agent wants to buy. This bears closer
resemblance to a home equity line of credit (HELOC) than to a mortgage. A HELOC
is a loan that uses the house currently owned as collateral for whatever expenses the
agent needs to ¯nance. The nature of the constraint allows me not to have to take a
position regarding the ultimate use of the amount borrowed, whether it is to buy more
residential stock or non-housing consumption goods. The empirical counterpart that
most closely resembles 1 ¡ ° would be the maximum fraction of the house that banks
allow homeowners to borrow against in the form of a HELOC. Private conversations with
commercial banks in the Iowa City - Coralville area reported values for 1 ¡ ° of about
0.9, and the range was roughly 0.8-19. These values are similar to assigned minimum
downpayment fractions in the literature when h0 is used in place of h in the borrowing
constraint. See for example Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), D¶ ³az and Luengo-
Prado (2003) or Peterson (2003). In Sections 3 and 4 I will present results (in addition
to a non-borrowing economy) with three values of 1 ¡ °: 0.8, 0.9 and 1.
Table 1 provides a summary of parameter values and their target/source.
9These fractions apply to the market value of the house net of mortgages, i.e. they apply to the value
of the \part" of the house the individual actually owns. At this point, the model is too simple to account
for this di®erence.
133.4 The Representative Agent Analog
For the purpose of evaluating the performance when matching the business cycle facts I
compare the previous model with an in¯nite-horizon representative agent economy. The
model is a standard real business cycle model with the same preferences de¯ned over
leisure, non-housing consumption and housing services.
The parameterization is almost identical; the only di®erence worth noticing is that to
achieve a fraction of time devoted to work of about 32% the parameter ! was set at a
higher value, 1.6. Technology parameters are the same, and the model period is also one
year. Thus a value of 0.96 is assigned to the discount factor ¯.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate Wealth Composition and the Business Cycle Facts
The ¯rst column in Table 2 presents a few selected aggregate ratios for the United States
economy during the period 1964-2003. All quantities were computed at an annual fre-
quency. The most noticeable feature is that the total capital-output ratio seems some-
what larger than values previously reported in other studies, such as Cooley and Prescott
(1995). However, my de¯nition of GDP does not include housing services, which are about
9%-10% of total output in the data. In the model there are implicitly two production
functions: one given by the Cobb-Douglas technology and another given simply by s = h.
Both provide \°ows" to the consumer, but what I call GDP in the model is only the
Cobb-Douglas part. Analogously, the de¯nition of non-housing consumption includes all
services, except the ones derived from housing (it also excludes expenditures in consumer
durables).
Table 3 describes some familiar business cycle facts for a few key variables: output,
consumption, investment and employment. The data were logged and detrended using
14a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter, and results are shown for deviations of variables around that
trend. Following Backus and Kehoe (1992) and R¶ ³os-Rull (1996) the smoothing parame-
ter in the HP ¯lter was set at a value of 100.
The business cycle stylized facts are apparent from the table. Investment, consump-
tion and employment are all highly procyclical, with all contemporaneous correlations
with output being larger than 0.7. In general, correlations with output turn negative or
stay close to zero when they are computed with either two leads or lags. Another famil-
iar fact is the high volatility of investment relative to output and consumption, and the
smaller variance of the former relative to the latter. Of course, de¯nitions of variables
coincide with those of Table 2.
4.1.1 The No-Borrowing Economy
This section presents results for the economy in which 1 ¡ ° is set to zero. The second
column of Table 2 shows the steady state values for several ratios for the no-borrowing
economy. The ¯gures are roughly consistent with US long-run averages, and in some
aspects the model performs remarkably well: the ratio of residential investment to GDP
coincides with the empirical value, and the fraction of residential capital to output is very
close (1.7 vs. 1.9).
On the contrary, the total capital to output ratio (K+H
Y ) of 4.677 seems large compared
to the value reported in Table 2, 3.477. It is expected that the introduction of borrowing in
the economy should partly alleviate this problem. The presence of a very tight borrowing
constraint increases the agents' desire of saving in an \anticipatory" sense, to avoid being
constrained in the future. How large this e®ect is will be discussed in the next section,
when wealth-dependent borrowing constraints are introduced.
Another possible explanation is the absence of a Social Security scheme that would help
¯nance retirees' expenditures. As Huggett (1996) notes, models without Social Security
15do a poorer job in matching capital-output ratios because of the overaccumulation of
capital undertaken by individuals during their working years.
The large capital-output ratio translates into a small value for the return on equity.
In this economy it is 3.07%. Although the return to equity in the data is di±cult to
measure for which is the return on the entire business capital stock, back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that it is of the order of 11% for the sample considered10. This might
imply that the discount factor used in the model is rather large.
Regarding business cycle statistics, Table 4 reports standard deviations and cross-
correlations with output for the same variables shown in Table 3. Results are presented
for the no-borrowing economy (NBE) and the representative agent (RA) model. Statistics
are computed from percentage deviations around the steady-state11, after ¯ltering the
model output in the same way as the data.
The NBE is roughly consistent with the business cycle facts, particularly when only
focusing on the main four aggregates: output, consumption, investment and employment.
Standard deviations have the correct magnitudes and the volatility of employment almost
matches the data exactly. Consumption, employment and investment are procyclical,
and correlations are small or negative when looking at two leads or lags. The proportion
of the variance of output in the data that is explained by technology shocks is 76%,
similar to ¯ndings in Cooley and Prescott (1995) who report 62%. There are no major
di®erences between the incomplete markets life cycle and the representative agent models,
with similar magnitudes for all statistics.
Both models have di±culties delivering the procyclicality of residential investment,
with a value farther away from the data in the NBE. In general, the performance is poor
10The way I have arrived at this ¯gure is by using the relationship r = ®GDP
K and subtracting the
depreciation rate ±k. Taxes have been ignored, and hence this number should be taken as a rough
approximation.
11Note: When referring to output from a model, steady-state means a long time series average.
16for both investment disaggregates. The standard deviations of residential and business
investment in the model are about 1.6 times their empirical counterparts. Moreover,
investment in housing and in business capital are negatively correlated. The most probable
explanation is the absence of any transaction costs when adjusting both capital stocks.
Peterson (2003) introduces adjustment costs and counter-cyclicality in earnings to improve
the correlation patterns between output and residential investment.
4.1.2 Wealth-Dependent Borrowing Constraints
The models in this section replace the constraint k0 ¸ 0 by k0 ¸ ¡(1 ¡ °)h. I present
results with three di®erent values of 1¡°: 0.8, 0.9 and 1. The last three columns of Table
2 report long-run averages of several aggregate ratios for all three versions of economies
with wealth dependent borrowing constraints.
Results are very similar to the ones shown in the second column of that same table,
i.e to the non-borrowing economy. The three versions of the model still match exactly the
ratio of residential investment to GDP, the fractions of business and residential capitals in
the economy have barely moved. The introduction of borrowing in the economy brought
the values of the total capital to output ratios closer to the data, but they are still con-
siderably large (the smallest is 4.56). As a consequence return on equity has increased,
approximating the complete markets value of 4.16%: the values in this three economies
were 3.43%, 3.47% and 3.57% respectively.
The utility function parameter ! was chosen so as to achieve a fraction of 31.5% of
time devoted to work in the non-borrowing economy. Values in these three economies
were about 30.9%, not far from the initial target.
The three panels in Table 5 report the business cycle statistics for economies where
borrowing is allowed. The correlation pattern of macroeconomic variables with output
are very similar to the ones reported for the NBE. Again, all four main aggregates are
17procyclical, but residential investment is not. Its correlation with output is now some-
what smaller than in the NBE (-0.22 on average versus -0.17), drifting its value away from
what the data says. Regarding the standard deviations, they remain roughly unchanged
for output, consumption and employment, but slightly increase for investment. In par-
ticular, the standard deviation of residential investment relative to output increases from
approximately 12 to about 15.
4.2 Portfolio Choice over the Life Cycle and the Business Cycle
This section examines the cross-sectional patterns of portfolio composition in all versions
of the model. Of special interest is trying to match the life-cycle pattern of real estate
and equity holdings.
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) has become the main source used by ¯nancial
economists to address any question related to the composition of balance sheets in US
households. I have used the 1998 and 2001 versions in which roughly 4,400 families were
interviewed. The SCF gives great detail on the housing side of households' asset position.
It provides responses about quantities owed from di®erent mortgages, HELOCs, market
values of primary residence, values of vacation homes and other real estate participations.
Without a not so direct relation to the model presented in this paper, it gives information
about types of mortgages (e.g. whether it is a mortgage from the Veterans' administration,
the Federal Housing Administration, etc...), frequency of payments, real estate taxes,
number of units in the lot, etc....
For the purpose of relating data to model, the ¯rst thing to notice is that an explicit
modelling of a rental market for housing services is absent from this paper. Everybody
is a homeowner. The ¯rst step in the treatment of the sample is to eliminate renters,
individuals that have zero housing wealth. There is still some ambiguity, however, on
which variable from the SCF best corresponds to the variable h in the model. In general
18individuals enjoy an entire home, but spend a large fraction of their lives paying for it.
This implies that in general agents do not own the house they live in, at least entirely.
In the 2001 SCF 35% of homeowners reported owning the entire value of their primary
residence. In the model, even more so in the no-borrowing economy, these two concepts
can not be easily di®erentiated. The two candidate variables for h are the value of the
primary residence and home equity. Home equity is de¯ned as the value of the primary
residence minus the sum of all outstanding mortgages minus the sum of all loans using the
house as collateral (in the form of HELOCs). Agents in the model demand housing based
on the marginal utility of housing services. In addition, the de¯nition of home equity
implies the existence of debt that can only be used to ¯nance a home purchase. For these
reasons, the variable that describes the housing position when comparing data and model
is the value of the primary residence. This is consistent with other work, for example
Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2003). The SCF variable that corresponds to total wealth is
\Net Worth" which is de¯ned as total assets minus total debt.
Figure 1 shows the life-cycle pro¯le of the ratio of housing to total wealth 12. Young
agents have little ¯nancial wealth, very often negative, and the value of the home they live
exceeds their total wealth by a factor between two and three. During their working years
agents accumulate ¯nancial assets, hence the housing to wealth ratio decreases, increasing
mildly at the end of their lifetime when non-housing assets are used to ¯nance retirement.
Figure 3 shows the ratio of housing to total net worth by level of wealth. I have
computed the ratio for two di®erent groups. The ¯rst includes the wealthiest 5% of
individuals in the sample, with this group denoted \rich". The second is the remaining of
the population (bottom 95%) which I denote \poor". With few age group exceptions, the
ratio of housing-to-wealth ratio increases as wealth decreases. For the rich the pattern
of the portfolio allocation is completely di®erent than that of the \poor". Although it is
12I have computed averages based on 5-year age groups.
19larger at the beginning of the agent's life, the di®erence is small: the mean housing-to-
wealth ratio is about 0.14 for the younger age groups, and approximately 0.05 for older
agents. On average, wealthy individuals have an almost ¯fteen times smaller housing
to wealth ratio than the \poorer" fraction of the population. As I will show below,
models capture the qualitative implication - for poor people the home is a relatively more
important asset- but underestimate the magnitude of this di®erence.
4.2.1 No-Borrowing Economy
By construction, in this economy there can be no di®erence between home equity and
the value of the home. This constrained the sample in the SCF further. In addition to
eliminating renters, I also eliminated all respondents for whom the value of the primary
residence exceeded the reported home equity.
Figure 4 compares the output from the model and what the data tell us. It is clear
that the performance of the model is very poor. The housing to wealth ratio barely varies
over the life cycle, while in the data experiences a large drop from the initial years to
older ages. A model where agents are not allowed to borrow does not seem to replicate
basic features of the data.
4.2.2 Wealth-Dependent Borrowing Constraints
Figures 5-8 show results for the three versions of the model where borrowing is allowed.
Models can accurately capture the rate of decline in the importance of housing in house-
holds' portfolios as the agents age. For values of 1 ¡ ° equal to 0.8 and 0.9, the peak
in the housing to wealth ratio occurs in the second age group (26-30), consistent with
the empirical evidence. For the model where 1 ¡ ° = 1 the peak occurs at the ¯rst age
group, and the maximum housing to wealth ratio is about 4.9, approximately twice that
observed in the data (2.4). However, for the ¯rst two cases, the magnitudes are roughly
20what is observed in the data. Moreover, the rate of decline in the housing to wealth that
occurs during the life cycle until retirement coincides with its empirical counterpart.
An important thing to notice is that the aggregate housing to wealth ratio as I have
measured it in the Survey of Consumer Finances, does not match with the aggregate
housing to total capital ratio calculated from the National Accounts. This can be due to
several reasons: measurement error, small sample size, etc...Given the variety of causes,
it is di±cult to take into account this discrepancy in a reasonable way. An implication
of this is that model understates the magnitude of the housing to wealth ratio, except in
the initial and ¯nal years of the individual's life.
The models are also consistent with housing taking a larger part of the households'
portfolios the poorer agents are. This is apparent from Figures 6-8. When disaggregated
by wealth, the di®erence occurs only in early ages, as opposed to all age groups as in the
data. In addition, the magnitude of the di®erence between the importance of the home
in households' portfolios when sorted by wealth is much smaller in any of the model's
version than in the data. For the three values of 1 ¡ ° of 0.8, 0.9 and 1, the magnitude
of the di®erence is 1.09, 1.14 and 1.32 respectively.
Regarding the allocation between real estate and equity over the business cycle, the
most characteristic feature is the larger weight of the home in households' portfolios in
recessions rather than in booms. The life-cycle portfolio pattern in booms and in reces-
sions is shown in Figure 9 13. It is noticeable though, that the di®erence is concentrated
in the initial age groups with no discernible pattern in recessions versus expansions for
older agents. As seen in Figures 10-12, the model economies are again able to reproduce
these facts: the weight of the home is reduced in booms and it only occurs for the younger
agents.
13Due to small number of years for which the Survey of Consumer Finances is available, there are no
other recession years besides 2001. In National Accounts, however, the correlation between GDP growth
and the ratio of the residential stock to the total capital stock ( H
(K+H)) is -0.25.
21Finally, Table 6 reports values for the Gini coe±cients by type of asset. In US data,
the Gini index for non-housing wealth, i.e. net-worth minus home equity, is 0.67 and it
is smaller for housing wealth (0.59). The pattern of concentration levels over the life also
di®er across types of assets as it is apparent in Figure 13. It depicts the Gini indices
for di®erent age groups for housing wealth and non-housing wealth. For non-housing
wealth, at younger ages the wealth distribution is more unequal given the existence of
many agents that are net borrowers. As agents age, the very small proportion of indi-
viduals with negative wealth decreases the Gini indices. For housing wealth, not only is
the level of concentration smaller for all age groups, but the levels vary less across age
groups relative to non-housing wealth. The model economies all deliver the qualitative
fact that concentration is larger for non-housing wealth than for housing wealth. How-
ever, quantitatively there is a large di®erence in magnitude for the Gini indices in housing
wealth. The models deliver coe±cients that are less than half of what is observed in the
data. The maximum Gini for housing wealth is 0.231. Model economies perform much
better delivering the correct magnitude for the degree of concentration in non-housing
wealth. Gini coe±cients are about 0.75 for economies with wealth-dependent borrowing
constraints, and even for the no-borrowing economy the Gini index is as high as 0.58.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to assess the ability of a standard macroeconomic model to de-
scribe features of the wealth distribution and portfolio composition observed in US data
regarding housing and ¯nancial wealth. Despite its simplicity, the model can account
jointly for wealth distribution moments as well as facts regarding economic °uctuations.
More speci¯cally, the model can deliver the typical life-cycle pattern of housing-to-wealth
ratio with a peak at young ages and a decrease throughout the agent's life. The peak
22occurs at the age group 26-30 with a value between 2 and 3, roughly what is observed
in US data. Another fact regarding housing and equity holdings is that the home is a
relatively more important asset for poorer agents than for the richer. Although the model
underestimates the magnitude of this di®erence, it can qualitatively account for the fact
that the housing to wealth ratio is smaller for wealthier households.
The relationship between macroeconomic shocks and portfolio choice has also been in-
vestigated. According to available data, the housing-to-wealth ratio is larger in recessions
than in booms, and most of the di®erence occurs in young agents' portfolios. The models
presented in this paper are also consistent with these facts.
Although the purpose of this study was to investigate the wealth distribution and port-
folio composition between housing and equity, the analysis was done within a business
cycle model. As a robustness check, I compared the moments for macroeconomic time
series in the model and in the data. While the model predicts countercyclical residential
investment, which is counterfactual, it does deliver the business cycle facts regarding rel-
ative standard deviations and correlations with output for employment, consumption and
aggregate investment.
236 Technical Appendix
6.1 De¯nition of Data Variables
6.1.1 National Accounting Data
Almost all of the aggregate data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website
(www.bea.gov). The only exceptions are the United States population, the average weekly
hours worked and the number of employees in the private sector, all of which come from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics Website ( www.bls.gov). The data are annual (except when
extracting the Solow residual, see below) starting in 1964 and ending in 2003.
² Gross Domestic Product: Output is de¯ned as Gross Domestic Product minus Con-
sumption Expenditures in Durable Goods minus Expenditures in Housing Services
minus Net Exports minus Government Consumption and Investment Expenditures.
To compute the business cycle moments (standard deviations and cross-correlations
with output), output was transformed into per capita terms through dividing by the
US population and transformed into real terms by de°ating using the GDP de°ator.
² Investment: Aggregate investment is Total Gross Private Domestic Investment.
Business investment is the sum of non-residential investment in structures, equip-
ment and software. Residential Investment is Total Investment minus Business
Investment.
² Consumption: Consumption is de¯ned as Personal Expenditures in Consumption
minus Expenditures in Durable Goods minus Expenditures in Housing Services.
Investment and Consumption were also de°ated by the GDP de°ator and trans-
formed into per capita terms through dividing by the US population.
² Employment The de¯nition of employment is the average weekly hours of production
workers in the private sector. (code CES0500000005, Bureau of Labor Statistics).
24² Capital Stocks: The stocks of both residential and business capital come from the
Fixed Assets Tables (Current Net-Cost). The de¯nition of Residential Capital is
Residential Structures. Business capital is de¯ned as Total Private Fixed Assets
minus Residential Structures.
² The Solow Residual: The computation of the technology process amounts to ¯tting
a ¯rst order autoregression to the deviations from a linear trend of the logarithm of
the Solow Residual. Let GDPt = AtK®
t N
1¡®
t . This implies the log-linear relation-
ship ln(At) = ln(GDPt) ¡ ®ln(Kt) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln(Nt). The empirical counterparts in
this equation are not de¯ned in per capita terms. The de¯nition of employment is
average weekly hours (same code as above) times the total numbers of production
workers in the private sector (code CES0500000001, BLS). The measure of Gross
Domestic Product included net exports but excluded government consumption and
investment expenditures. The frequency in this calculation is quarterly. The Bureau
of Economic Analysis does not provide quarterly estimates of the capital stock. I
constructed the quarterly series by applying the perpetual inventory method, using
the investment °ows, assuming a depreciation rate of 0.025 per quarter and ¯xing
the initial capital stock to be the 1963 estimate from Table 1.1 in the Fixed Assets
section of the Bureau of Economic Analysis National Accounts. Investment was
de¯ned as quarterly Gross Private Domestic Investment. Capital Stocks and Gross
Domestic product were de°ated using the quarterly GDP de°ator.
Once ln(At) has been computed, its deviations around a linear trend are the empir-
ical counterpart of ln(zt) in the model.
6.1.2 Wealth Data
Data on the wealth distribution comes from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
This survey provides information about the wealth composition, income, and demographic
25variables. It is sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and collected by the National Or-
ganization for Research at the University of Chicago. It is conducted every three years
and its sample size is relatively small, interviewing around 4,500 families.
The SCF oversamples wealthier families, given the high level of concentration of the
wealth in the United States, therefore appropriate weights need to be used to compute
statistics from this dataset. All calculations reported in this paper are weighted averages.
De¯nitions of Variables: I have de¯ned variables in the same way as Aizcorbe, Ken-
nickell, and Moore (2003).
² Financial Assets: Instruments in this category include checking accounts, savings
accounts, money market accounts (including the ones in mutual funds), call ac-
counts at brokerage houses, certi¯cates of deposit, stocks (including stocks at mu-
tual funds), government bonds (including mutual funds), tax free bonds, mortgage-
backed bonds, corporate and foreign bonds , IRAs (and other quasi-liquid retirement
accounts), account type pension plans (including 401(k)'s), life insurance and other
¯nancial assets (including among other things cash or royalties).
² Non-Financial Assets: Includes the value of all vehicles, the value of the primary
residence and other real estate participations, vacation homes, net equity in business
at market value, and other non-¯nancial assets (such as jewelry, art, rare books,
etc...).
² Home Equity: De¯ned as Value of Primary Residence minus the sum of all mortgages
(up to three mortgages) minus the value of all home equity lines of credit (HELOCs)
on the primary residence.
² Debt: Housing debt (which includes debt on primary residence and all other resi-
26dential property), credit card debt, other installment loans, loans against pensions,
against life insurance, and any other miscellaneous loans.
² Net Worth: It is de¯ned as Total Assets (¯nancial and non-¯nancial) minus Total
Debt.
In computing the averages reported in the paper I focused solely on homeowners. In addi-
tion, responses of an exact zero value for net worth were also eliminated. The reason was
simply to avoid dividing by zero when looking at housing to wealth ratios. The treatment
of outliers was rather rudimentary: I decided to leave out families that reported housing
to net worth ratios larger than 100 (in absolute value). The number of eliminations was
not large but some ratios reported were over 1000, which given the small sample had a
large impact on the age-group averages.
6.1.3 Income Data
The parameterization of the idiosyncratic earnings process was taken from Peterson (2003)
Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) who use estimation results from Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (2001) (STY). STY obtained annual data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 1993, and constructed 24 3-year repeated panels
to estimate the earnings model. Earnings are de¯ned as wage earnings by the head
of the household plus female wage earnings plus total transfers to the household. The
latter include unemployment insurance, transfers by non-household members and workers'
compensation. Total earnings are transformed into per member earnings by dividing by
family size, and de°ated to 1968 dollars using the CPI.
6.2 Computational Details
This section provides a step-by-step description of the model solution.
271. Specify grids K = fk1;:::;kKg;H = fh1;:::;hHg and KN = f(K=N)1;:::;(K=N)Ng
for individual business capital holdings, individual housing holdings and aggregate
capital-labor ratios.
2. Guess an initial value for the parameters a(z);b(z) in (15).
3. Solve for the optimal decisions at all age groups, levels of income, wealth, and ag-
gregate states (aggregate capital-labor ratio and technology shock). The way these
policy functions are computed is by approximating them as piecewise linear func-
tions and solving the nonlinear system resulting from grouping ¯rst-order conditions
and the budget constraint. The ¯rst order conditions give the following three non-
linear equations (after substituting for the Lagrange multiplier, and eliminating
individual-level holdings as states to simplify notation):































And ¯nally, the budget constraint:
0 = ci(K=N;z;») ¡ (1 ¡ ±h)h ¡ (1 + r(K=N;z) ¡ ±k)k ¡ w(K=N;z)ni´i»+
+ki(K=N;z;») + hi(K=N;z;») (26)
The problem for retirees is simpler: there is no (25) and (26) does not include the
wage term. In case of a corner solution a constrained system is solved in which the
¯rst Euler equation disappears and the decision rule ki is set to the lower bound in
28capital holdings. The goal is to solve for the four decision rules ci;hi;ki;ni;8i 2 I
in all possible states. Interpolation between grid points is linear in three dimensions
(k,h and K=N). Regarding the non-linear equation solver, in this paper I have used
the FORTRAN routine \hybrd1" in MINPACK c °14.
4. Once all decision rules have been calculated it is necessary to simulate the economy.
Starting with an initial distribution over wealth and income, the economy is simu-
lated forward in the following way: at each point in time I add an initial 21-year
old generation with a distribution over income that matches the fractions implied
by (18) and with zero holdings of business capital and housing capital. With a
known value for the aggregate shock z and a value for the aggregate capital-labor
ratio from the previous time period, I can compute all new decisions of investment,
consumption and employment by simulating income shocks. This new simulation
gives a new value for the aggregate capital-labor ratio, which coupled with a new
value drawn for the aggregate shock implies that I move forward to the next time
period.
It is important to have a large number of agents for each age group. I used 250,
which gives a total number of agents in the economy equal to 15,000. However, to
minimize the error I \enforced" the law of large numbers by making sure that the
fractions of labor income levels implied by (18) matched the theoretical ones, by
randomly adjusting the values of the shocks.
5. Once an aggregate time series has been computed, a(z) and b(z) in (15) are estimated
by maximum likelihood using Newton's method.
6. If these new values for a(z);b(z) are \close" to the initial ones, an equilibrium has
14This package was developed by the Argonne National Laboratory, and it is freely downloadable at
www.netlib.org.
29been found. If not update the new values by setting (for an arbitrary iteration j),
a(z)NEW = Áa(z)OLD + (1 ¡ Á)a(z)j
b(z)NEW = Áb(z)OLD + (1 ¡ Á)b(z)j
for Á 2 (0;1), and return to Step 2.
The forecasting rule was of the form:
ln(K=N)t+1 = a(zt+1) + b(zt+1)ln(K=N)t + ²t+1 ²t+1 » N(0;¾
2(zt+1))
Let zg;zb represent values of technology in expansions and in recessions respectively.






2(zt+1) = f1:26 £ 10








2(zt+1) = f2:29 £ 10








2(zt+1) = f2:00 £ 10








2(zt+1) = f1:97 £ 10




It is important to assess the accuracy of the equilibrium solution. The most controversial
component is the forecasting errors made by agents when predicting the aggregate capital-
labor ratios. The reported R2 and the magnitude of the variance give a rough idea. Figure
14 reports the actual and the one-step ahead predictions of the aggregate capital-labor
ratio in the no-borrowing economy. The average deviation of the forecast (in absolute
terms) from the actual value of ln(K=N) was 0.0099. As a fraction of ln(K=N) this
implies an average error of 0.2%.
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Figure 2: E±ciency Pro¯le. Source: Huggett and Ventura (1999)
Table 1: Summary of Parameter Values
Parameter / Variable Value Target / Source
¯ 0.96 Gourinchas (2000)
! 1.2 1/3 time at work
µ 0.8 20% exp. in housing; Peterson (2003)
» | Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)




z f0.9795,1.0205g Solow residual; NIPA
1 ¡ ° 0.9 Commercial Banks; IC-Coralville
35Table 2: US data (1964-2003) vs. Model Economies
Variable US data 1 ¡ ° = 0 1 ¡ ° = 0:8 1 ¡ ° = 0:9 1 ¡ ° = 1
(Ik + Ih)=GDP 0.260 0.358 0.351 0.349 0.347
Ih=GDP 0.081 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.082
Ik=GDP 0.179 0.275 0.268 0.267 0.265
C=GDP 0.740 0.642 0.649 0.651 0.653
(K + H)=GDP 3.471 4.677 4.611 4.583 4.563
K=GDP 1.754 2.754 2.680 2.671 2.652
H=GDP 1.717 1.923 1.931 1.911 1.912
K=(K + H) 0.505 0.589 0.581 0.583 0.581
H=(K + H) 0.495 0.411 0.419 0.417 0.419
Table 3: US data (1964-2003)
Std. Dev. Cross-correlations with GDP
Absolute Rel. to GDP xt¡2 xt¡1 xt xt+1 xt+2
GDP 0.027 1.000 -0.221 0.433 1.000 0.433 -0.221
Consumption 0.012 0.431 -0.323 0.314 0.778 0.456 -0.024
Aggregate Investment 0.083 3.015 -0.135 0.438 0.962 0.374 -0.267
Business 0.066 2.412 -0.271 0.126 0.747 0.630 0.030
Residential 0.186 6.796 0.003 0.553 0.851 0.051 -0.402
Employment 0.005 0.172 0.018 0.479 0.788 0.062 -0.431
36Table 4a: No Borrowing Economy, ( (1 ¡ °) = 0)
Std. Dev. Cross-correlations with GDP
Absolute Rel. to GDP xt¡2 xt¡1 xt xt+1 xt+2
GDP 0.020 1.000 0.021 0.397 1.000 0.397 0.021
Consumption 0.009 0.450 -0.073 0.297 0.937 0.206 0.114
Aggregate Investment 0.041 2.058 0.057 0.423 0.990 0.459 -0.017
Business 0.090 4.514 0.169 0.387 0.714 -0.343 -0.270
Residential 0.289 12.430 -0.170 -0.175 -0.173 0.797 0.330
Employment 0.007 0.172 0.141 0.472 0.966 0.229 -0.157
37Table 4b: Representative Agent Economy
Std. Dev. Cross-correlations with GDP
Absolute Rel. to GDP xt¡2 xt¡1 xt xt+1 xt+2
GDP 0.024 1.000 0.044 0.475 1.000 0.475 0.044
Consumption 0.010 0.400 -0.019 0.395 0.896 0.143 0.063
Aggregate Investment 0.055 2.281 0.064 0.480 0.988 0.567 0.036
Business 0.116 4.769 0.201 0.467 0.679 -0.319 -0.284
Residential 0.284 11.699 -0.197 -0.199 -0.062 0.837 0.378
Employment 0.01 0.400 0.102 0.505 0.982 0.536 -0.016
Table 5a: Borrowing Constraint, ( (1 ¡ °) = 0:8)
Std. Dev. Cross-correlations with GDP
Absolute Rel. to GDP xt¡2 xt¡1 xt xt+1 xt+2
GDP 0.022 1.000 0.007 0.405 1.000 0.405 0.007
Consumption 0.010 0.475 -0.048 0.322 0.884 0.041 0.052
Aggregate Investment 0.046 2.115 0.029 0.411 0.980 0.527 -0.012
Business 0.107 4.944 0.159 0.411 0.712 -0.335 -0.333
Residential 0.331 15.329 -0.158 -0.213 -0.212 0.746 0.382
Employment 0.008 0.376 0.129 0.482 0.966 0.229 -0.164
38Table 5b: Borrowing Constraint, ( (1 ¡ °) = 0:9)
Std. Dev. Cross-correlations with GDP
Absolute Rel. to GDP xt¡2 xt¡1 xt xt+1 xt+2
GDP 0.022 1.000 0.003 0.410 1.000 0.410 0.003
Consumption 0.011 0.477 -0.074 0.312 0.896 0.124 0.151
Aggregate Investment 0.047 2.105 0.035 0.425 0.982 0.506 0.096
Business 0.111 5.021 0.168 0.422 0.708 -0.335 -0.295
Residential 0.342 15.454 -0.171 -0.229 -0.230 0.732 0.417
Employment 0.009 0.396 0.117 0.485 0.968 0.233 -0.052
Table 5c: Borrowing Constraint, ( (1 ¡ °) = 1:0)
Std. Dev. Cross-correlations with GDP
Absolute Rel. to GDP xt¡2 xt¡1 xt xt+1 xt+2
GDP 0.022 1.000 0.004 0.419 1.000 0.419 0.004
Consumption 0.011 0.485 -0.059 0.323 0.870 0.079 0.135
Aggregate Investment 0.047 2.137 0.031 0.427 0.977 0.532 -0.053
Business 0.112 5.037 0.173 0.433 0.703 -0.331 -0.360
Residential 0.349 15.728 -0.176 -0.227 -0.214 0.736 0.386
Employment 0.009 0.409 0.121 0.493 0.969 0.278 -0.183






































Figure 3: Housing to Wealth Ratio by Level of Wealth, Source: Survey of Consumer
Finances






































Figure 4: No-Borrowing Economy versus Data













































Figure 5: Economies with Borrowing Constraints versus Data









































Figure 6: Housing to Wealth Ratio by Level of Wealth, 1 ¡ ° = 0:8









































Figure 7: Housing to Wealth Ratio by Level of Wealth, 1 ¡ ° = 0:9













































Figure 8: Housing to Wealth Ratio by Level of Wealth, 1 ¡ ° = 1







































Figure 9: Housing-to-Wealth Ratios, Source: Survey of Consumer Finances (1998 and
2001).
Table 6: Gini Coe±cients by Type of Wealth
Economy Non-Housing Wealth Housing Wealth
US Data 0.676 0.590
1 ¡ ° = 0 0.586 0.231
1 ¡ ° = 0:8 0.755 0.225
1 ¡ ° = 0:9 0.763 0.227
1 ¡ ° = 1 0.782 0.225










































Figure 10: Housing-to-Wealth Ratios, 1 ¡ ° = 0:8











































Figure 11: Housing-to-Wealth Ratios, 1 ¡ ° = 0:9










































Figure 12: Housing-to-Wealth Ratios, 1 ¡ ° = 1















Figure 13: Gini Coe±cients over the Life Cycle by Type of Wealth









Figure 14: Actual (solid) vs. One-Step Ahead Predictions (dotted) for Capital-Labor
Ratio
46